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ABSTRACT
The jurisprudence on standard-essential patents (SEPs) has evolved substantially in the last few
years, particularly in the European jurisdictions, where EU courts have dealt with certain FRAND
and antitrust issues in an unambiguous and novel manner. The 2015 landmark judgement in
Huawei v. ZTE by the Court of Justice of the European Union brought clarity in understanding
‘unwilling licensee’ and laid down terms under which the holder of a FRAND-compliant SEP can
seek injunctive relief that does not amount to an abuse of its dominant position. Four important
judgements in Germany followed, where the regional courts have applied the CJEU principles laid
down in Huawei and brought further clarity on the same. This paper analyzes the contentious issue
of injunctive relief as a remedy for infringement of standard essential patents under FRAND
licensing terms. In this direction, the first part of this paper evaluates four cases in which the EU
courts granted injunctions for SEPs compliant with FRAND royalty obligations under the Huawei
framework. The second half of this paper updates the reader about developments in the Indian
FRAND jurisprudence, and offers an analysis, along with some suggestions.
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FAILURE IS NOT FALLING DOWN BUT REFUSING TO GET UP: IMPLICATION OF
HUAWEI/ZTE FRAMEWORK (CJEU 2015) IN EUROPE
ASHISH BHARADWAJ AND DIPINN VERMA*
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 22nd 2016, Maureen K. Ohlhausen, then US Federal Trade
Commissioner, asked in a keynote speech, “What are we talking about when we talk
about Antitrust?” She clarified that “antitrust violation should be the elimination or
dilution of a demand – or supply – side market constraint on a firm’s power” instead
of the “imperfect market outcomes” such as high prices, low output, reduced quality,
limited choice, and compromised innovation incentives. Commissioner Ohlhausen
stressed that “simply condemning a high price, a refusal to deal, or the use of a SEP
without showing harm to supply – and demand – side limits on market power is not
antitrust . . . it is a regulatory action meant to reengineer market outcomes to reflect
enforcers’ preferences.”1 Competition agencies around the world generally prevent
collaborations among competitions, but they are not hostile of voluntary standard
settings in technologies that rely on principles of interoperability and compatibility.
Standards involve risk of anti-competitive abuse since the adoption of a standard
eliminates competition between competing technologies, which could lead to
consumer harm. To mitigate this risk, patent holders, especially in high technology
industries, typically provide an assurance that they will license patents on fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.2 This is subject to inclusion of
their declared patents as ‘essential’ to working of the standard. A legal consequence
of making such declaration is that it obliges the patent owner to license only on
FRAND terms to underline their willingness to do so. The licensing parties – patent
holder and the implementer – are expected to apply an objective consideration
whenever they are negotiating the terms of the agreement.
Contemporary standards are becoming ubiquitous in today’s markets.
Expansion of international commerce, especially in ICT, and a surge in litigation
concerning SEPs, are reverberations from the continuous evolution of global
* Ashish Bharadwaj 2018. Dr. Ashish Bharadwaj (corresponding author) is Assistant Professor
and Director of Jindal Initiative on Research in IP and Competition (JIRICO) at Jindal Global Law
School, India. He can be reached on abharadwaj@jgu.edu.in. Dipinn Verma is pursuing Advanced
Master Degree in Intellectual Property Law and Knowledge Management at Maastricht University,
The Netherlands. We thank Joy Saini, research assistant at JIRICO, for valuable research
assistance. We also thank the participants of the Asia Pacific Innovation Conference held in 2016 in
Kyushu University, Fukuoka (Japan), and participants of the seminar held in June 2017 in the
College of Law & Business, Ramat Gan (Israel). The opinions expressed in this work are
independent of any research grants received from governmental, intergovernmental and private
organisations. The authors’ opinions are personal and are based upon their research findings and do
not reflect the opinions of their respective institutional affiliations.All errors remain ours.
1 Excerpt from the keynote address delivered by US FTC Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen
on September 22, 2016 in New York in a private dinner hosted in her honor by Concurrences
Review.
Synthesis
available
at
https://www.concurrences.com/events/dinner-in-honor-ofcommissioner-maureen-ohlhausen-new-york-22-september-2016/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
2 IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, § 6.1 (2018), and Rules of Procedure ETSI, § 6.1 (2017).
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standards. Significant jurisprudence has emerged in the US and EU in the past
decade, several countries, including India, China, and South Korea, are grappling
with issues ranging from alleged abuse of dominance by SEP holders, to
determination on the right royalty base for calculating FRAND royalties, and seeking
damages and injunctive relief in case of patent infringement, among others.3 Amidst
rapid changes in development, diffusion and adoption of technologies, propelled by
proliferation of patents, actions of technology developers (contributors to standards)
and technology adopters (implementers of standards), have enormous implications
for firms, growth of industries and growth of economies.
In eBay v. MercExchange (2006), the ‘general rule’ which entitled the prevailing
patentee to an injunction, was rejected by the US Supreme Court.4 In addition, it
provided a four-factor test, to be applied by lower courts before granting such
injunctions. The plaintiff, as per the test, has to demonstrate that: 1) it has suffered
irreparable injury; 2) remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; 3) the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and the defendant have
been considered; and 4) the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.5
Germany has been a preferred litigation forum in Europe, bringing it to the
center of gravity for smartphone litigation. Since German courts have historically
been rather lenient in granting injunctions in patent infringement, the burden of
proof lies mainly on the defendants when they invoke a competition law defence.
Three recent decisions of the Courts in Germany developed case law on the granting
of injunctive relief in cases dealing with infringement of standard essential patents,
applying the rules established by the European Court of Justice in its Huawei v. ZTE
decision.6 The CJEU decision in Huawei has provided clarity in interpreting Article
102 TFEU (abuse of dominant position) of the EU competition law.7 One of the key
questions was regarding the circumstances under which seeking a claim for an
injunction would amount to an abuse of dominance. This question was answered by
CJEU in Huawei v. ZTE after years of prolonged ambiguity and diverging opinions of

3 J. Gregory Sidak, FRAND in India: The Delhi High Court’s Emerging Jurisprudence on
Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. LAW & PRACTICE 609-618 (2015).
4 eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
5 Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical
Study, 101 IOWA LAW REVIEW 1949 (2016). An original empirical study looked into the impact of
the eBay judgment on the permanent injunction decisions of district courts post-eBay. The study
showed a bifurcated regime in cases of patent remedies between competing and non-competing (also
non-practicing) entities. It finds that companies competing against an infringer still obtained
injunctions in most cases which were successfully litigated to judgment. However, it’s the opposite in
cases of non-competing companies, which generally have failed to secure injunctions. Kirti Gupta &
Jay P. Kesan, Studying the impact of eBay on Injunctive relief in Patent cases, UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF LAW LEGAL STUDIES Research Paper No. 17-03 (2016). Another study found
that the eBay decision dramatically reduced the number of injunctions sought and the rate at which
they were sought, especially preliminary injunctions.
6 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp., C-170/13 ECJ (2015) (hereinafter Huawei v.
ZTE).
7 See Haris Tsilikas, Huawei v. ZTE in context – EU Competition Policy and Collaborative
Standardization in Wireless Telecommunications, INT. REV. OF INTELL. PROP. AND COMP. L. 48-2,
151-178 (2017).
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the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH).8 The decision primarily laid down terms
under which the holder of a FRAND-compliant SEP can seek injunctive relief and
further removes some vagueness in understanding what constitutes an ‘unwilling
licensee’. It is now up to the national courts of individual member states of the EU to
apply CJEU’s general framework and implement their guidelines to resolve questions
that have been left unanswered by the CJEU. After this decision, an SEP holder
seeking an injunction is obliged to convincingly prove that it pursued licensing
negotiations with the infringer by offering FRAND royalty rates. However, the
admissibility of a claim for injunctive relief by the SEP holder is contingent on the
compliance of the license offer with FRAND royalty terms that the SEP holder has
committed to the SSO.9 Determining whether the offer is FRAND-complaint is still
contentious and is largely undecided by the court. The Regional Courts of Dusseldorf
and Mannheim in Germany addressed some of these questions in Sisvel v. Haier,10
SLC v. Deutsche Telekom,11 and NTT DoCoMo v. HTC GmbH.12 Although these
decisions are currently under appeal, they throw light on application of the Huawei v.
ZTE decision in admissibility of FRAND defence in SEP infringement cases.
Competition law of the European Union has taken a prominent role in the ICT sector
that has always been more patent and SEP-intensive.13 Even though the litigants in
these cases are global, but non-European companies, the fact that Europe was chosen
as the forum for patent litigation highlights the importance of EU cases and decisions
in matters of SEPs. This paper analyses the contentious issue of injunctive relief as a
remedy for infringement of standard essential patents under FRAND licensing
terms, and seeks to contribute to the debate by examining the developments in
different jurisdictions, subsequent to the decision of CJEU in Huawei v. ZTE, in
disputes where the SEP holder that has made a FRAND commitment to the SSO has
sought injunctive relief against alleged infringers of standard essential patents. This
paper evaluates four cases in which the EU courts granted injunctions for SEPs
compliant with FRAND royalty obligations after applying steps laid out in Huawei v.
ZTE. This section will analyse each case with a view to identify the unique features
that influenced the courts to grant injunctions.

8 In
its Orange
Book
Standard judgment
(Orange-Book-Standard,
KZR
39/06
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) Federal Supreme Court (May 6, 2009)); see also the European Commission
in its investigations into Samsung (European Commission, Case AT.39939 – Samsung –
Enforcement of UMTS Standard Essential Patents, Decision No. AT.39939, O.J. (C 350/08) (2014))
and Motorola (European Commission, Case AT.39985 - Motorola – Enforcement of GPRS Standard
Essential Patents, Decision No. AT.39985, O.J. (C 344/06) (2014)).
9 The implications are that if the initial FRAND assertion by the SEP holder is contested,
perhaps based on a different methodology or final rate of royalty, there is likely to be a significant
delay in proceedings because an expert will have to be appointed, and, in the meantime, an
injunction may not be granted.
10 Sisvel v. Haier, Regional Court of Düsseldorf, 4a O 93/14, 4a O 144/14 (2015).
11 Saint Lawrence Communications v. Deutsche Telekom, Regional Court of Mannheim, 2 O
106/14 (2015).
12 Sisvel, and Saint Lawrence Communications (hereinafter SLC) are non-practising entities.
13 European Commission, EU Commission publishes Landscaping study on SEPs by IPlytics,
IPLYTICS, 18 (2016), available at http://www.iplytics.com/general/eu-commission-publisheslandscaping-study-seps-iplytics/ (Study commissioned by DG GROW Unit F. 5, European
Commission).
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In eBay v. MercExchange (2006), the ‘general rule’ which entitled the prevailing
patentee to an injunction, was rejected by the US Supreme Court.14 In addition, it
provided a four-factor test, to be applied by lower courts before granting such
injunctions. The plaintiff, as per the test, has to demonstrate that: 1) it has suffered
irreparable injury; 2) remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; 3) the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and the defendant have
been considered; and 4) the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.15
Under Directive 2004/48/European Commission on the enforcement of
intellectual property law, Art. 2: (1) on the scope states,
Without prejudice to the means which are . . . provided for
in . . . national legislation, in so far as those means may be more
favourable for right-holders, the . . . remedies provided for by this
Directive shall apply . . . to any infringement of intellectual property
rights.
Art. 3 (2) on general obligation, “remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of the
intellectual property rights covered by this Directive . . . shall also be effective,
proportionate and dissuasive”, and Art. 11 on injunctions, “Member States shall
ensure that, where a judicial decision is taken finding an infringement of intellectual
property rights, the judicial authorities may issue against the infringer an injunction
aimed at prohibiting the continuation of the infringement.”16
Under the German Code of Civil Procedure Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO),17 a
motion for preliminary injunction can be filed under §§ 935 and 940. Injunction
regarding the subject matter of the litigation is an available remedy given the
concern that a change of the status quo might frustrate the realization of the right
enjoyed by a party, or might make its realization significantly more difficult.18
Injunctions are also admissible for the purpose of providing for a
temporary status concerning a legal relationship that is in dispute, to
the extent this provision is deemed to be necessary in order to avert
significant disadvantages, to prevent impending force, or for other
reasons, in particular in the case of legal relationships of a long-term
nature existing,
eBay, supra note 5.
Seaman, supra note 6. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2632834An
original empirical study looked into the impact of the eBay judgment on the permanent injunction
decisions of district courts post-eBay. The study showed a bifurcated regime in cases of patent
remedies between competing and non-competing (also non-practicing) entities. It finds that
companies competing against an infringer still obtain injunctions in most cases which are
successfully litigated to judgment. However, it’s the opposite in cases of non-competing companies,
which generally have failed to secure injunctions. Gupta
et.
al.,
supra
note
6.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2816701Another study found that the eBay decision dramatically reduced
the number of injunctions sought and the rate at which they were sought, especially preliminary
injunctions.
16 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, Directive 2004/48/EC, OJ L 157, 30.4.2004
(Apr. 29, 2004) (on the enforcement of intellectual property rights).
17 Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl) FEDERAL LAW GAZETTE, Code of Civil Procedure, I at 3202; 2006 I
at 431; 2007 I at 1781 (Dec. 5, 2005), last amended by Article 1 of the Act, FEDERAL LAW GAZETTE, I
at 3786 (Oct. 10, 2013).
18 Zivilprozessordnung, German Code Civ. Pro. § 935 (2017); hereinafter (ZPO).
14

15
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Zivilprozessordnung, German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO), § 940. Section 139 (1) of
the German Patent Act says, “Any person who uses a patented invention in
contravention of Sections 9 through 13 may, if there is a danger of repetition, be sued
by the injured party for injunctive relief. This claim shall also apply if there is a
danger of first perpetration.”19
II. HUAWEI V. ZTE
A functional market for technology balances the interests of innovators, who rely
on incentives to further develop technologies that enhance industrial capabilities,
and the interests of implementers, who rely on these technologies to make standardcompliant devices. This balance is disturbed when the incentives for innovators are
constrained in ways that are commercially unviable, or when access to technologies is
hindered by strategic and opportunistic behavior of the patent owner.20 Either way,
an environment is created where innovation is at a suboptimal level. If an
implementer chooses to reject a ‘reasonable’ license offer from a SEP holder, it leaves
the SEP holder with no choice other than suing the potential licensee to effectively
enforce the standard essential patent. Injunctive relief as a statutory remedy may be
justified in cases where breach of promise to charge fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) royalties as a defence cannot be proved by the licensee.21
FRAND terms, in essence, are a range of royalty rates calculated on the basis of
reciprocity and a royalty base, keeping in mind the duration, scope and geographic
markets that can be encompassed as part of the agreement. Competition concerns in
cases of SEPs emerged in Europe in 2009 when the German Federal Court of Justice
in Orange Book laid the groundwork for subsequent FRAND cases in Europe.22 The
court in Orange Book Standard held that to prevent a grant of injunction, an alleged
infringer of SEPs could rely on a competition law-based defence in exceptional cases.23
The court ruled that determination of abuse of the dominant position by the SEP
holder rests on the alleged infringer fulfilling two conditions. The burden of fulfilling
the two conditions would be on the defendant as well.24 The first condition, to enter
into a licensing agreement with the SEP holder unconditionally by offering royalties
that either the SEP holder could not reasonably decline, or at a plaintiff-determined
value that will be reviewed by the court. Second, to render an account of activities
concerning use of the SEP and pay royalties as if a license agreement was already in
place, (i.e. waive all non-infringement and invalidity defences).25 In April 2014, the
19 ZPO § 242. “An obligator has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith,
taking customary practice into consideration.”.
20 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1991, 1992–93 (2007).
21 J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of Frand, Part II: Injunctions, 11 J. COMP. LAW AND
ECONOMICS 200, 201-269 (2015).
22 Orange-Book-Standard, KZR 39/06 Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) Federal Supreme Court (May 6,
2009) (hereinafter FCJ Orange-Book Decision); translated in IPEG BLOG, https://perma.cc/LW9B28KM (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
23 Id. at 11.
24 Id. at 13 ¶ (b).
25 Id.
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EC in its Samsung and Motorola Mobility decisions clarified that a SEP holder’s
action of seeking injunction against a willing licensee would tantamount to an abuse
of a dominant position.26 Further, the European Commission advanced a safe harbor
approach for an alleged infringer who was considered a “willing licensee” against
whom no injunction should be granted if the infringer agreed to enter into a license
agreement and considered a court-determined FRAND royalty to be binding.27
Further, the alleged infringer would remain free to challenge essentiality and
validity of the underlying SEP28 since “it is in the public interest to allow challenges
to the validity of patents and to ensure that royalties are not unduly paid.”29 In 2013
in Huawei Technologies v. ZTE Corp.,30 the Landgericht Düsseldorf (Düsseldorf
Regional Court) opined that, “a mere willingness on the part of the infringer to
negotiate in a highly vague and non-binding fashion cannot, in any circumstances, be
sufficient to limit the SEP-holder’s right to bring an action for a prohibitory
injunction”.31 However, the European Commission and the German Federal Court of
Justice held contrasting views on the conditions that had to be met by alleged
infringers of SEPs in order to have a competition law defense when negotiations for
FRAND licensing had failed to yield an outcome.32 Consequently, the Dusseldorf
Regional Court sought clarification from the CJEU on five questions. On July 16,
2015, in Huawei v ZTE, the CJEU held that a patent holder must initiate by
notifying the prospective licensee of the infringement, mentioning the SEP being
infringed, and the way it is being infringed. The patent holder is obligated to make a
written license offer on FRAND terms (specifying the royalty amount and
methodology adopted to calculate it), after the prospective licensee has clearly
26 European Commission, Case AT.39985 - Motorola – Enforcement of GPRS Standard Essential
Patents, Decision No. AT.39985, O.J. (C 344/06) (2014) (hereinafter EC Motorola Decision);
European Commission, Case AT.39939 – Samsung – Enforcement of UMTS Standard Essential
Patents, Decision No. AT.39939, O.J. (C 350/08) (2014) (hereinafter EC Samsung Decision).
27 EC Motorola Decision at ¶¶ 427 and 437.
28 EC Samsung Decision at ¶¶ 99 and 107. In particular, in Samsung the EC held that the
applicable rules on burden of proof in litigation regarding challenges of the patent licensing
agreement will not be altered and that “the court will be requested by the parties, and the
arbitration tribunal shall take into account issues of validity, infringement and essentiality.”.
29 EC Motorola Decision at ¶ 491. This ensures that “companies, and ultimately consumers, are
not obliged to pay for patents that are not infringed.” (emphasis added) (see also European
Commission MEMO, Antitrust decisions on standard essential patents (SEPs) - Motorola Mobility
and Samsung Electronics - Frequently asked questions, RAPID PRESS RELEASE (Apr. 29, 2014),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-322_en.htm; At the time the Düsseldorf court
referred to the CJEU, final decisions on Motorola and Samsung were not made public, and only EC
press releases were available.
30 Huawei had declared its European patent in Germany (E.U. Patent No. EP2090050B1 (filed
Apr. 29, 2008)) as essential to the long-term evolution (LTE) telecommunication standard of ETSI,
and undertook to grant licenses to third parties on FRAND terms. When discussions between the
parties to conclude a license of FRAND terms could not be reached, Huawei sued ZTE before the
Dusseldorf Regional Court for infringement of this patent without paying royalties. Huawei sought
an injunction, product recall, rendering of accounts, and award of damages.
31 Huawei, at ¶ 50.
32 In Huawei v. ZTE, the Düsseldorf court found that an injunction would be granted against
ZTE if the court would have applied Orange-Book-Standard. However, the court would have
dismissed Huawei’s action for an injunction if the court would have applied the guidelines set out in
the Samsung press release of the EC that was based on the competition law defense under Article
102 TFEU (depending on what was considered sufficient to be a willing licensee).
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indicated their willingness to enter into a licensing agreement on FRAND terms.33
The court said that the prospective licensee has to then “diligently” respond to the
offer, in accordance with “recognized commercial practices in the field and in good
faith”.34 In case the offer is unacceptable, the licensee should “promptly” propose a
counter offer. Due diligence by licensing parties that are expected to act in good faith
implies that they will not engage in conduct that is “tactical and/or dilatory and/or
not serious” and can delay the process of negotiation, and defer the execution of a
licensing agreement.35 The CJEU, in the Huawei v. ZTE decision held that for a SEP
holder to not observe the specificities of the process, after committing to license on
FRAND terms, while pursuing an injunction, would amount to an abuse of dominant
position, pursuant to Article 102 TFEU, resulting in a denial of injunctive relief.
According to the court, indispensability of said SEP (essentiality)36 and SEP holders
irrevocable undertaking to the SSO (FRAND commitment)37 “create[s] legitimate
expectations on the part of third parties that the proprietor of the SEP will in fact
grant licences on such terms,” and “a refusal […] to grant a licence on those terms”
may, amount to an abuse of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU. This can
very well be a defense in actions seeking injunctive relief.38 Further, in an attempt to
weigh the interests of both parties, the court now requires both parties to take
specific and concrete steps within a procedural framework.39
The opinion of the CJEU was that action of a holder of FRAND-committed SEPs
on bringing an action for infringement, seeking an injunction or product recall, would
not amount to an abuse of dominant position, if (1) (a) prior to bringing the action,
the SEP holder alerts the alleged infringer of the infringement by designating the
patent in question and providing details of the infringement; and (b) the SEP holder
presents a specific written offer to licence – after the infringer expresses a
willingness to execute a licensing agreement on FRAND terms – with clear
specifications of how the royalty was calculated.40 Under (2) the alleged infringer
continues to infringe on the said patent and does not diligently reciprocate to the
licence offer proposed by the SEP holder, as per established commercial practices and
in good faith, or adopts delaying tactics.41 CJEU also imposed requirements on the
SEP implementer. The alleged infringer who chooses to not accept the initial offer
can invoke Article 102 TFEU defense only if the infringer submits to the SEP holder,
promptly and in writing, a counteroffer on FRAND terms. The decision essentially
enhances the restrictions already placed on the alleged infringer’s behavior in
Huawei, at 9 ¶ 63.
Id. at ¶ 65.
35 Id. at ¶ 50.
36 Huawei, at ¶¶ 49-57.
37 Id. at ¶¶ 51 and 52.
38 Id. at ¶¶ 53 and 54.
39 Id. at ¶ 42
Court must strike a balance between maintaining free competition — in respect of
which primary law and, in particular, Article 102 TFEU prohibit abuses of a
dominant position — and the requirement to safeguard that proprietor’s
intellectual-property rights and its right to effective judicial protection,
guaranteed by Article 17(2) and Article 47 of the Charter [of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union] respectively.
40 Huawei, at 10 ¶ 71.
41 Id.
33
34
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FRAND negotiations by applying EC’s safe harbor provision, striking a bargain
between the Orange Book decision of the Federal Court of Justice and the Samsung
and Motorola decisions of the European Commission.42
The decisions in recent SEP cases of Germany’s regional and higher courts apply
CJEU’s Huawei v. ZTE framework. Some questions are answered in the affirmative,
while some are left unanswered. Each of these cases are briefly analyzed with a view
to identify the unique features that influenced the courts to grant injunctions in
infringement of FRAND encumbered SEPs.
III. SISVEL V. HAIER
Sisvel v. Haier43 is Germany’s first SEP-related case since the CJEU issued its
decision in Huawei v. ZTE.44 In stating facts and preliminary decisions, Sisvel made
a successful injunction application in the Regional Court of Dusseldorf against Haier
Deutschland GmbH and Haier Europe Trading SRL – subsidiaries of the Chinese
Qingdao Haier Group (“Haier”). Sisvel had issued a FRAND declaration to ETSI for a
portfolio of patents essential to UMTS and GPRS standards, also consisting of
patents that Nokia had assigned to Sisvel in 2012.45 In 2014, Haier wrote to Sisvel
indicating its intention to license one of the patents in the portfolio. Haier rejected all
license offers sent by Sisvel (royalties ranged from $0.5 per unit to $0.15 per unit)
and put forward counter offers that it believed were reasonable. Haier communicated
the first counter offer immediately after Sisvel instituted the case in September 2014
and the second counteroffer came before the oral hearing on Sisvel’s injunction
application against Haier. In addition to making these counteroffers, Haier asked the
Dusseldorf court to reject Sisvel’s injunction application because the patent that was
the subject of the latter company’s infringement claim and was part of a FRAND
declaration. The court rejected Haier’s arguments and granted Sisvel’s motion for
injunction against German and European distributors of Haier from selling
infringing products in Germany that were UMTS and GPRS compliant. The court did
not decide whether Sisvel abused its dominant position pursuant to Article 102
TFEU, it concurred that Sisvel seeking injunctive relief would not constitute abuse of
dominant position under the Huawei v. ZTE decision of CJEU. It is worth
mentioning that the court acknowledged that although Sisvel had not given a notice
of infringement to Haier before filing its complaint, Sisvel’s complaint was filed
before the CJEU’s judgment in Huawei v. ZTE, making the case transitional in
nature.46 Therefore, Sisvel was not required to notify Haier before filing the
complaint, and the complaint itself was considered to be sufficient warning under the
FCJ Orange-Book Decision; EC Samsung Decision; EC Motorola Decision.
Sisvel Wireless Patent Portfolio v. Qingdao Haier Group, Regional Court of Landgericht
Dusseldorf, 4a O 93/14, 4a O 144/14 (Nov. 3, 2015).
44 Huawei, supra note 7.
45 Sisvel has signed patent licensing deals based on its patents (including more than 300 patens
acquired from Nokia) that Sisvel claims it has declared essential to functioning of 2G, 3G and 4G
wireless standards. See generally SISVEL, http://sisvel.com/wireless.
46 According to principles set out by CJEU in Huawei v. ZTE, the plaintiff is required to give a
notice of infringement with sufficient details about the underlying patents and the way they are
being infringed before seeking injunction.
42

43
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circumstances. An analysis of the ruling demonstrates that three factors influenced
the court to grant the injunction against Haier. The first factor was Haier’s decision
to use the offers and counteroffers as a delaying tactic. The court evaluated the
circumstances of the case and discovered that Sisvel responded to Haier’s licensing
request in a swift manner, but Haier deployed delaying tactics in its counteroffers,
and hence Haier’s FRAND defense could not stand. The evidence suggested that
Haier made its first counteroffer in September 2014 after learning about Sisvel’s
decision to institute a case against it for patent infringement. Further, the evidence
indicated that Haier made the second counteroffer prior to the commencement of the
oral hearings on Sisvel’s injunction application. The conduct of both parties became
material in the court’s analysis on the merits of Sisvel’s injunction application. The
second factor that contributed to the success of Sisvel’s preliminary injunction
application was Haier’s failure to provide a record on its past use of the invention.
The court argued that Haier had a duty to provide security and present an accurate
report on all of the accrued royalty immediately after it decided to reject Sisvel’s
licensing offers. The court added that Haier, as the licensee, had a legal duty to
demonstrate that it was a willing licensee. The third factor was that the court did not
decide whether the license offer from Sisvel met FRAND requirements because
Haier’s counteroffer failed to meet the requirement laid down in Huawei v. ZTE. The
court did not see a need to decide whether Sisvel’s license offer was FRAND
compliant because defendant’s counteroffer failed to meet the Huawei v. ZTE
requirements.
Haier appealed the lower court’s decision to the Düsseldorf Upper District Court
(Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Düsseldorf), which issued an interim order suspending the
injunction originally issued by the lower court in Sisvel v. Haier.47 The appeals
court’s decision was based on evident flaws in the application of the Huawei v. ZTE
requirements by the lower court. It was decided that the lower court wrongly
assumed that the initial offer from the SEP holder was FRAND compliant. The
appeals court held that the initial offer by the SEP holder must be FRAND compliant
to oblige the alleged infringer to make a counteroffer. It should be noted that the
Düsseldorf Court of Appeals confirmed in its decisions that it’s,
prima facie the District Court had correctly found infringement and a
sufficient likelihood of validity of the Sisvel patents. The Court of
Appeals confirmed that Sisvel is entitled to enforce these judgments
regarding the claims for rendering accounts and damages. However,
it stayed the enforcement in view of the injunctive relief.48
IV. SAINT LAWRENCE COMMUNICATIONS (SLC) V. DEUTSCHE TELEKOM

47 Sisvel Wireless Patent Portfolio v. Qingdao Haier Group, Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf Court
of Appeals, 15 U 65/15 (Jan. 13, 2016). This is an interim order and OLG Dusseldorf will hear full
appeal proceedings.
48 SISVEL,
Düsseldorf Court Of Appeal Hands Down First Decision On Frand,
http://www.sisvel.com/news-events/news/duesseldorf-court-of-appeal-hands-down-first-decision-onfrand (Jan. 22, 2016); Sisvel official press release on January 22, 2016.http://www.sisvel.com/newsevents/news/duesseldorf-court-of-appeal-hands-down-first-decision-on-frand
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Soon after the Sisvel decisions of the lower court of Dusseldorf, the Regional
Court of Mannheim granted an injunction in SLC v. Deutsche Telekom49 against the
implementer, Deutsche Telekom, whose FRAND and Article 102 TFEU defenses
were rejected. SLC approached Deutsche Telekom offering a license on its SEP, along
with a copy of the complaint (that was filed by SLC but had not been served), after
filing for infringement.50 HTC offered to accept a license from SLC on FRAND terms
on two conditions: that it should be limited to Germany, and the royalties should be
assessed by the High Court of England and Wales.51 HTC and Deutsche Telekom
alleged that SLC did not comply with the requirements under Huawei v. ZTE and,
therefore, SLC’s action seeking injunction amounts to an abuse of dominant
position.52 Specifically, it was alleged that SLC breached its FRAND commitment by
calculating the royalty rates on the basis of global sales, rather than sales in
Germany.53 It was held by the court that SLC’s action did not amount to abuse of
dominance.54 An analysis of the ruling demonstrates that two factors influenced the
court to deny Deutsche Telekom a Huawei defense. First, SLC brought an action for
an injunction after notifying the alleged infringer who did not express willingness to
take a license from SLC. An analysis of the ruling suggests that the application of
requirements in Huawei v. ZTE by the Mannheim Regional Court was divergent
from that of the Dusseldorf Regional Court in Sisvel v. Haier.55 The sequential
ordering of the requirements was strictly followed in the latter, while Mannheim
court’s order was inexact in its interpretation of the procedural steps laid by CJEU
(discussed in the earlier section). Another interesting aspect that arises from SLC v.
Deutsche Telekom relates to the actual targets of the lawsuit. In many of these cases,
courts will only issue an injunction after the affirmation of the infringement. In the
case of Philips v. SK-Kassetten,56 a Dutch court underlined its commitment to
focusing on the party’s patent infringements rather than the list of extraneous issues
that may block the ability to access the injunction. In that case, the judge issued an
injunction to the holder of the SEP because of its belief that the patent owner’s
FRAND commitments did not undermine the ability to enforce patent rights by
seeking an injunction against a licensee.57 The arguments of the court in the Philips
case is that FRAND commitments do not foreclose the patent owner’s right to seek an
injunction when the licensee violates the terms of that license. Further, the case
suggests that the judge will pay very little attention to the conduct of the patent
49 SLC v. Deutsche Telekom, Regional Court of Mannheim, case no. 2 O 106/14 (Nov. 27, 2015)
and Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, I-15 U 65/15, I-15 U 66/15 (Jan. 13, 2016).
50 The International Patent Evaluation Consortium had recognized SLC’s patent to be essential
to the working of the AMR-WB standard in mobile phones, and the patent holder had committed to
ETSI to license it on FRAND terms.
51 HTC provided bank guarantees and submitted information on sales of its phones to the court,
while continuing to commercially sell the infringing products. SLC rejected the offer and, as a result
of which, HTC and Deutsche Telekom filed for abuse of dominant position due to SLC’s action to
seek injunction.
52 Id. at ¶ 3.
53 Id. at ¶¶ 19 and 29.
54 Id. at ¶ 22.
55 Sisvel, supra note 44.
56 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. SK Kassetten GmbH & Co. KG, District Court The
Hague, The Netherlands, No. 316533/HA ZA 08-2522, 316535/HA ZA 08-2524 (Mar. 17, 2010).
57 Id. at ¶ 6.18.
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owner because of the belief that such conduct does not undermine the patent holder’s
ability to exercise his rights by seeking an injunction against continued infringement.
Second, the court did not decide on FRAND compliance, (i.e. whether the offer by the
SEP holder adhered to the FRAND commitment it had made to the SSO).58 The court
held that, per the requirement of Huawei v. ZTE, the alleged infringer was obligated
to propose a counteroffer in response to any license offer made by the SEP holder as
long as the latter conveys the requisite information on the rate and how the royalty
was determined.59 In other words, the counter offer from the implementer is not
conditional on the initial offer being fundamentally compliant with FRAND terms.
The approach of the Mannheim Court seems to be inconsistent with the Higher Court
of Dusseldorf in Sisvel v. Haier, which suggested that the alleged infringer’s duty to
respond to the initial offer is conditional on whether the initial offer was indeed
FRAND compliant.60
V. NTT DOCOMO V. HTC GERMANY
In this third case, The Mannheim Regional Court granted an injunction against
HTC Germany after NTT DoCoMo claimed that HTC Germany was violating its
patents.61 In contrast to Sisvel v. Haier, the Court did not assess whether NTT’s
initial offer complied with FRAND terms.62 Instead, the court argued that an
assessment of the initial offer would only be appropriate if it was so excessive that it
violated FRAND requirements.63 The court added that their ability to make the
assessment that the offer was excessive depended on the conduct of the party accused
of breaching the patent. In this case, the court argued that HTC Germany’s
obligation after receiving the ‘excessive’ offer was to make a counteroffer that was
compliant with FRAND requirements.64 The court evaluated the conduct of HTC
Germany and discovered that the company did not issue a counteroffer immediately
after receiving the offer, and instead continued to use NTT’s products.65
Two important facts emerge from the analysis of this case. The first factor that
emerges from the analysis is that courts focus their attention on the patent owner’s
rights rather than the patent owner’s conduct. In this case, the judges’ conduct
suggested that that right superseded any conduct that the patent owner might have
58 Rufus Pichler & Holger Kastler, First German Decisions Applying the ECJ’s Huawei v. ZTE
Framework on Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents, LEXOLOGY, 6. (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a1c1c8d7-83d6-4611-8e6a-8afd3d85c713.
59 Id. at ¶ 6.19.
60 Sir Robin Jacob, Lessons from HUAWEI v. ZTE, 1 ITALIAN ANTITRUST REV. 11 (2017);
George Nolte & Lev Rosenblum, Injunctions in SEP cases in Europe, SSRN 10, 10 (Mar. 2017).
61 NTT DoCoMo to. DoCoMo v. HTC Germany, Regional Court of Mannheim, 7 O 99/15 (Feb.
19, 2016); 7 O 100/15 (June, 6 2016).
62 Jacob, supra note 61 at 15.
63 George, supra note 61 at 15.
64 Dietrich Kamlah & Jonathan A. Kropp, Mannheim Regional Court differs from Higher
Regional Court of Duesseldorf on requirements for FRAND offer, TAYLOR WESSING BLOG (Feb. 20,
2018),
https://deutschland.taylorwessing.com/en/mannheim-regional-court-disagrees-with-higherregional-court-of-duesseldorf-on-requirements-for-frand-offer.
65 Id. at 15.
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engaged in to deny him those rights. This approach is consistent with the approach
that other courts in the EU have taken regarding the exercise of patent rights by
individuals who have FRAND obligations, but are seeking an injunctive relief against
a company that is continuing to infringe on its patent. In 2014, the courts in the UK
underlined this view in the case of Vringo v. ZTE.66 In this case, the UK court ruled
that Vringo’s patent was valid and that ZTE had infringed it.67 In making this ruling,
the court stated that Vringo’s ability to obtain injunctive relief depended on the
existence of the patent as well as evidence that the company’s actions infringed on
that patent.68 This argument demonstrates that the actions of the company
infringing on the patents are more important than the actions of the individual who
has suffered damage because of the patent infringement. Therefore, the focus on
patent infringement is an acknowledgement that the SEP holders’ FRAND
commitment does not extinguish their right to seek injunctive relief and enforce their
respective patents. The second issue that emerges is that courts have put in place
measures to safeguard the process of FRAND negotiations against abuse. They
acknowledge that obtaining an injunctive relief can aid the patent holder in using the
injunctions as a tool for increasing the offer or delaying the process of license
acquisition. The case of Samsung v. Apple69 demonstrates that, in certain instances,
a party may use the injunctions as a tool for delaying the other party’s acquisition of
the license. In this case, a Dutch court rejected Samsung’s request for an injunction
against Apple’s continued infringement on its patents.70 The court made this decision
after it evaluated the conduct of Samsung and realized that it was using the
injunction as a strategy for delaying Apple’s product release.71 The court argued that
Samsung’s FRAND commitment was evidence that it had committed to developing
an agreement with Apple.72 According to the Court, this agreement meant that Apple
had received an irrevocable contract that entitled it to obtain a FRAND license from
Samsung.73 The agreement gave Samsung an obligation to engage in good faith
negotiations with Apple.74 During these negotiations, Samsung went on to offer a
price that it suggested was consistent with FRAND practices, though limited to the
Netherlands only.75 In this case, the judge evaluated the conduct of the parties and
realized that Samsung instituted the case before even replying to Apple’s license offer
request.76 This led the court to believe that Samsung was using the judicial process
and injunctions as a means for frustrating Apple.77 This case is different from other
cases where courts have issued an injunction because an analysis of Apple’s conduct
demonstrates that it was willing to provide the FRAND negotiated term.
66

ZTE).

Vringo Infrastructure Inc. v. ZTE (UK) Ltd., EWHC 1591 (Pat) (2013). (hereinafter Vringo v.

Vringo Infrastructure Inc. v. ZTE (UK) Ltd., EWHC 3294 (Pat) (2014).
Vringo, supra note 67, at ¶ 68.
69 Samsung v. Apple, District Court of The Hague, doc.no.400367/HAZA 11-2212 (Mar. 14,
2012).
70 Id. at 26 ¶ 4.50.
71 Id. at 24 ¶ 4.42.
72 Id. at 16 ¶ 4.6.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 18 ¶ 4.15.
75 Id. at 13 ¶ 2.32.
76 Id. at 22 ¶ 4.35.
77 Id. at 21 ¶ 4.32.
67
68
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VI. SAINT LAWRENCE COMMUNICATIONS (SLC) V. VODAFONE
Soon after an injunction was granted in SLC v. Deutsche Telekom, a similar
dispute was handled by the court with the same plaintiff but a different telecom
operator. In SLC v. Vodafone,78 an injunction was granted by the regional court of
Düsseldorf against Vodafone, which was offering to sell smartphones using SLC’s
essential patent.79 HTC was participating as a third-party intervener for delivering
smartphones embedded to Vodafone.80 This judgment is of significant relevance, as it
went on to further clarify the obligations of parties as initially provided in Huawei v.
ZTE.
The first issue the court identified was that SLC need not be proven to be in
dominant position for the purpose of further proceedings and, therefore, SLC’s
alleged dominance was not considered by the court as a starting point of the case.81
The court then clarified that a notice of infringement furnished after bringing an
action will not, on its own, render the claim for injunctive relief unenforceable.82 As
this complaint was raised before the guidelines for prior notice of infringement were
laid down by CJEU in Huawei v. ZTE, the court held that not adhering to CJEU’s
guidelines was rather inconsequential in this matter.83 In transitional cases such as
this one, notification could be delivered by servicing the action brief containing all
relevant information required by the defendant. In addition, the court acknowledged
that unnecessary delay would be caused if the complainant was forced to withdraw
the action and file another complaint following CJEU’s guidelines.84
The court refused defendant’s argument that license fees demanded were higher
than industry-standard royalty rates and held: “It should be noted that not every
deviation from industry practice indicates an abuse. When comparing royalties, the
technology to be licensed in each case must also always be considered.”85 The
defendant had received sufficient information regarding the calculation of royalties
in the offer that was held to be compliant with FRAND terms by the court after
examining comparable royalties within (anonymized) licensing agreements of six
other mobile telecommunications companies submitted by the plaintiff.86 These
comparable licensing agreements and the prevalent industry practice were justly
held as relevant factors while determining whether the license offer was FRAND
compliant or not.
Similar to the approach adopted in both SLC v. Deutsche Telekom and NTT
DoCoMo v. HTC, the court laid emphasis on the fact that the defendant, Vodafone,
failed to follow the guidelines by not submitting any counter-offer and also failed to
SLC v. Vodafone, LG Düsseldorf, 4a O 73/14 (Mar. 31, 2016).
E.U. Patent No. EP1125276B1 (filed Oct. 27, 1999); held by SLC.
80 Gabriella Muscolo, The Huawei Case, Patents and Competition Reconciled?, 1 HORIZONS OF
COMMERCIAL LAW 2017, 18, ISSN 2282 - 667X (2017), http://rivistaodc.eu/edizioni/2017/1 (last
visited Feb. 20, 2018).
81 Vodafone, supra note 79, at 3 ¶ 1.
82 Id. at 9 ¶ 2.
83 Id. at 7 ¶ 2.
84 Huawei, supra note 7.
85 Vodafone, supra note 79, at 17 ¶ (e).
86 Id. at 15.
78
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provide any security in response to the initial offer. On the other hand, the three
counteroffers made by the intervener (HTC) were held to be non-FRAND compliant
due to two reasons: first, it was only limited to the German territory; second, the
royalty rates offered were considered significantly low by the court.87 It was opined
that offering a worldwide portfolio license does not amount to violation of FRAND
obligations, since it is a globally accepted practice of the industry. Taking a departure
from the CJEU guideline, it was held that the SEP owner is not required to provide
precise mathematical calculations for the estimated royalties that were demanded.
Rather, a range of values of standard licensing royalties prevailing in the market was
deemed to be sufficient, which SLC did present in the court.88 The approach taken by
the court in SLC v. Deutsche Telekom, of finding the telecom operator as a suitable
defendant was followed in this case as well. However, unlike any post-Huawei case,
the German court in SLC v. Vodafone went on to decide (in the affirmative) FRAND
compliance of the initial offer made by the SEP owner.89 The court acknowledged that
the plaintiff was skeptical in presenting freely negotiated license agreements.90
However, court held that not every license fee negotiated under the threat of
injunctive action is necessarily abusive and excessive – an assertion confirmed by the
CJEU in its judgment.91
VII. IMPLICATION OF RECENT CASE LAW
The CJEU guidelines brought much needed clarification that was applied in
subsequent cases to understand whether there was abuse of dominant position by
SEP owners while seeking injunctive relief. The guidelines have been applied by
courts in recent cases as discussed above, either explicitly adhering to the guidelines
or with modifications to suit specificities of the case. However, there are questions
that are yet to be resolved in future proceedings. Post Huawei, the method of
determination of whether a given SEP holder is in a dominant position or not is still
unclear, since the guidelines are applicable where the SEP holder is already held to
be dominant in the market.
Another point of ambiguity pertains to the sequence of obligations of the
licensing parties. The sequential ordering of requirements was strictly followed in
Sisvel, while the court in Deutsche Telekom as well as in Vodafone was inexact in its
interpretation of procedural steps laid by CJEU. In addition, there is no certainty in
respect to the timing to be adhered to by the alleged infringer. In other words, it is
not clear as to how long an alleged infringer can take before responding to the
offer/notice given by the SEP owner, or the time for providing security after a
counter-offer is rejected by an SEP owner. Even though in the above cases courts
have dealt with this issue, albeit without consistency. For instance, a duration of one
year92 and eighteen months93 in Sisvel and NTT DoCoMo respectively, were
Id. at 30.
Id. at 21.
89 Id. at 12.
90 Id. at 17.
91 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp., C-170/13 ECJ at 77.
92 Sisvel, supra note 44.
87
88
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considered significantly late to reply to SEP-owner’s notice/offer. Further, a period of
one month94 and three months95 in Sisvel and Deutsche Telekom, respectively, were
considered adequate for providing security after SEP owner’s rejection of counter
offer.
Other than SLC v. Vodafone, none of the other cases addressed the question
whether the offer made by the SEP owner was FRAND compliant. The courts mostly
focused on the counter-offers made by the alleged infringers, without examining
whether the SEP owner’s initial offer was FRAND compliant or not. However, it is
worth mentioning that instead of a fresh assessment of the SEP holder’s offer, the
court in this case relied on the existing comparable licenses submitted by the SEP
owner to determine FRAND compliance. While this approach indeed satisfies the
‘non-discriminatory’ prong of FRAND, it cannot be said accurately in respect to the
‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ prongs of FRAND terms. It seems there is still scope for
clarification required from courts since the existing comparable licenses that are
presented may not be ruled to be entirely free of any kind of injunctive threat.96
The judgment of the appellate court in Huawei v. ZTE is expected to be
announced soon, in addition to the forthcoming decisions from appeals made in Sisvel
v. Haier97 and SLC v. Deutsche Telekom.98 Several questions, including those
mentioned above, are expected to be clarified. The guidelines provided in Huawei, in
addition to the clarification provided in Vodafone, provide some guidance to the
alleged SEP infringers. It is advisable to provide a FRAND-compliant counter-offer to
an SEP owner at the earliest instance of receiving the offer/notice. Even though it is
unclear how an offer is determined FRAND-compliant, Vodafone provides an
indication towards comparable license agreements and prevalent industry practices
as useful considerations.
VIII. WHAT CAN INDIA LEARN FROM THE EMERGING EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE?
With the world’s second-largest wireless subscriber base, India houses more
than 150 mobile device vendors.99 With over one billion mobile subscribers, India has

NTT DoCoMo, supra note 62.
Sisvel, supra note 44.
95 Deutsche Telekom, supra note 50.
96 Haksoo Ko, Facilitating Negotiation for Licensing Standard Essential Patents in the shadow
of Injunctive Relief Possibilities, SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (May 15, 2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2267280
Under a proposed court procedure, the court would make an interim assessment
of the FRAND compliance of the offer initially and final decision could be taken at
a later stage, when it is necessary to do so . . . this will provide lesser incentive for
the parties to engage in opportunistic behavior and encourage participation in
fruitful negotiations.
97 Sisvel, supra note 44.
98 Deutsche Telekom, supra note 50.
99 Jorge L. Contreras & Rohini Lakshane, Patents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical
Survey,
50
VANDERBILT
J.
TRANSNATIONAL
LAW
1,
2
(2017).https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2756486
93
94

[17:326 2018] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

342

attained the position of second-largest mobile subscribers base in the world.100 The
Indian mobile handsets market had been dominated by foreign manufacturers like
Samsung, Nokia and Sony for over several years, but the status quo has changed
dramatically in the past few years with the emergence of domestic players like
Micromax, Lava and Intex. The increasing dominance of domestic players along with
Chinese producers like Xiaomi, Lenevo and Oppo, flourished the market with a host
of smartphones with high specs at low prices.101
In spite of such developments, the Indian smartphones market had been
relatively unaffected by the SEP and FRAND wars, until the beginning of SEP
litigations in the past three to four years. Multiple suits against several domestic
Indian smartphone makers have been brought by multi-national telecom companies,
led by Ericsson in most cases. These legal actions have led to several orders being
passed by the courts, mostly in favor of the foreign patent holders, as well as
intervention by the Competition Comission of India (CCI).102 There have been
multiple instances of Indian courts granting injunctions against the domestic
manufacturers.
The earliest dispute involving SEP in India occurred between Ericsson and
Kingtech Electronics103 for the import of ‘G’Five’ brand handsets into India, which
comprised of patents owned by Ericsson.104 In August 2013 Ericsson went on to
obtain an injunction order against Kingtech, where the Delhi High Court refrained
them from importing such handsets implementing Ericsson’s Adaptive Multi Rate
technology patents.105
The second such instance occurred with the patent infringement suit filed by
Ericsson against Micromax, alleging violation of its 8 standard essential patents, in
March 2013. From thereon, apart from Micromax, Ericsson initiated proceedings
against other smartphone manufacturers operating in India, domestic as well as
foreign, including Gionee, Intex, Xiaomi, iBall, and Lava in the High Court of
Delhi.106 Apart from Ericsson, the US-based Vringo Infrastructure Inc. is another
100 Mahanagar Doorsanchar Bhawan, The Indian Telecom Services Performance Indicators,
TELECOM
REGULATORY
AUTHORITY
OF
INDIA
(Dec.
1,
2016),
http://www.trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/Indicator_Reports_April_June_01_12_2016.pdf
(reporting
1059.86 million subscriptions as of June 30, 2016).
101 Contreras et. al., supra note 100 at 2.
102 In Re Intex Technologies (India) Limited v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ),
Competition Commission of India, Case No. 76/2013 (Jan. 16, 2014).
103 Kingtech Electronics (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, High Court of Delhi, W.P.(C)
6878/2011, C.M. No. 15811/2011 (Dec. 19, 2011).
104 AMR Patents: Indian Patent No. IN203034 (filed Mar. 9, 2001) (Linear Predictive Analysis
by synthesis encoding method and encoder); Indian Patent No. IN203036 (filed Mar. 14, 2001)
(Apparatus for producing from an original speech signal a plurality of parameters); IN234157 (A
method of encoding/ decoding multi-codebook fixed bitrate CELP signal block); Indian Patent No.
IN203686 (Method and system for alternating transmission of codec mode information); Indian
Patent No. IN213723 (Method and apparatus for generating comfort in noise in a speech decoder).
105 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson v. Kingtech Electronics (India) Pvt. Ltd., High Court of
Delhi, CS (OS) 68/2012 (Aug. 22, 2013).
106 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson v. Best IT World (India) Private Limited (iBall), High Court
of Delhi, CS (OS) 2501/2015 (Sept. 2, 2015); Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson v. LAVA International
Limited, High Court of Delhi, CS 764/2015 (Mar. 24, 2015); Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson v.
INTEX Technologies (India) Limited, High Court of Delhi, CS (OS) 1045/2014 (Mar. 13, 2015);
Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson v. XIAOMI, High Court of Delhi, CS 3775/2014 (Aug. 12, 2014);
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party which has taken patent infringement actions (against ZTE) for alleged
violation of its SEPs. In most of the cases, courts ruled in favor of the patent holder,
injunctions were granted in Ericsson’s favor and the manufacturers were directed to
submit security and royalties determined by the courts. In addition to the court
actions, few manufacturers have also approached the Competition Commission of
India (CCI), alleging abuse of dominance by Ericsson. However, the competition
aspect is outside the scope of this paper. In December 2014, Delhi High Court
granted an injunction to Ericsson against Micromax and directed Micromax to pay
royalties ranging from 0.8-1.3% of the net selling price of the infringing device.107
That is, the court preferred the use of ‘downstream device’ as the royalty base.
Interestingly, the court calculated the royalty using the comparable license method,
examining such 26 licenses executed between Ericsson and other Indian parties.108 In
addition, the court clarified the nature of the royalties determined, holding them
merely an interim arrangement and not a determination of FRAND rates for
Ericsson’s portfolio.
Similarly, in Ericsson v. Intex,109 the court found the practice of using net selling
price of the downstream device as royalty base, to be FRAND.110 In deciding the
above, the court referred to the downstream device approaches adopted in the US
case Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Organisation v. Cisco Sys. (hereinafter
CSIRO v. CISCO)111 and by the Chinese Competition Authority (NDRC) towards
Qualcomm’s SEPs for 3G/4G technologies.112 Owing to the similar facts, the court
used the same royalty rates which were decided in Ericsson v. Micromax, and an
injunction was granted, restraining Intex from manufacturing or importing the
infringing devices. Ericsson also succeeded in obtaining an ex-parte injunction113
against Xiaomi, restraining it from selling and importing its devices using Ericsson’s

Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson v. GIONEE Communication Equipment Co. Limited, High Court of
Delhi, CS 2010/2013 (Oct. 31, 2013); Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson v. Kingtech Electronics (India)
Pvt. Ltd., High Court of Delhi, CS (OS) 68/2012 (Aug. 22, 2013).
107 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson v. Mercury Electronics & Anr., High Court of Delhi, CS
(OS) 442/2013, 2, ¶ 4 (Nov. 12, 2014).
108 Id. at 1, ¶ 1.
109 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson v. Intex Technologies (India) Ltd., High Court of Delhi, CS
(OS) 1045/2014 (Mar. 13, 2015).
110 Id. at 250, ¶ 158.
111 Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Organisation v. Cisco Sys., No. 6:11-cv-343, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107612 (E.D. Tex. July 23, 2014)
Basing a royalty solely on chip price is like valuing a copyrighted book based only
on the costs of the binding, paper, and ink needed to actually produce the physical
product. While such a calculation captures the cost of the physical product, it
provides no indication of its actual value.
Id. at 22.
112 People’s Republic of China National Development and Reform Commission Administrative
penalty decision, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM COMMISSION (Mar. 2, 2015)
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201503/t20150302_666209.html. Decision delivered by National
Development and Reforms Commission, China on March 2, 2015. Original order:
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201503/t20150302_666209.htmltranslated to English: available at
https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ndrc.gov.cn
%2Fgzdt%2F201503%2Ft20150302_666209.html.
113 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson v. Xiaomi Technology and Ors., High Court of Delhi, CS
(OS) 3775/2014 (Dec. 8, 2014).
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patented technology. However, Xiaomi was able to get the injunction partially
vacated114 on the ground that Ericsson concealed the fact about Xiaomi’s ‘Global
Patent License Agreement’ with Qualcomm.115 This agreement authorized Xiaomi to
use two out of eight alleged patents owned by Ericsson, as royalties were already
being paid by Xiaomi to Qualcomm. This led the court to temporarily allow Xiaomi to
resume the sale, on conditions of using only Qualcomm chipsets and depositing
security of an amount equivalent to three month sales.
In the case of Vringo v. ZTE,116 Delhi High Court granted an ad-interim exparte injunction against ZTE on manufacture and sale of the infringing devices
alleged by Vringo. However, the injunction was later lifted, with the court ordering
ZTE to submit a bank guarantee of INR 50 million.117 This became the first case in
the series of SEP litigation where courts agreed to appoint a ‘scientific advisor’.118
However, in December 2015, Vringo and ZTE entered into confidential settlement
and a licensing agreements,119 under which both agreed to withdraw all pending
litigations across the world.
Apart from the court proceedings, the CCI has been approached by Micromax,
Intex and iBall,120 claiming abuse of dominance by Ericsson in its licensing practices.
On a prima-facie basis, in its preliminary ruling, CCI held Ericsson as dominant in
the relevant market and considered its licensing practices. CCI opined that Ericsson
abused its dominant position by imposing high and unfair royalty rates and by
forcing parties to sign Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA). Interestingly, no other
court or competition authority outside India has raised any competition issues in
respect to NDAs, as the nature of such licenses themselves require that secrecy be
maintained, due to the nature of information contained therein. Even though the
final investigation by CCI is still underway and the final order is expected to be out
soon, the position taken by CCI on most issues has been exactly opposite to what the
Indian courts have held till now.
IX. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the Huawei v. ZTE decision, with its six-step test,
brought clarification regarding the conduct of the SEP holder and the alleged
infringer in respect to SEP licensing on FRAND terms.121 However, there are
114 Id.; Telefonaktiebolaget Lm, High Court of Delhi, IA 3074/2015 in CS (OS) 3775 2014 (Apr.
22, 2016).
115 Ashish Bharadwaj, Delhi High Court partially vacates interim injunction with respect to
Ericsson’s 3G standard essential patents, 11 JIPLP 873 (2016).
116 Vringo v. ZTE, High Court of Delhi, CS (OS) 2168/2013 (Nov. 8, 2013).
117 Rohini Lakshané, Joining the Dots in India's Big-Ticket Mobile Phone SEP Litigation, 14,
13-16, SSRN (Oct. 31, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=.
118 Id.
119 CCPIT Patent & Trademark Law Office, ZTE made a $21.5 Million Global settlement with
Vringo, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 11, 2015) http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b118fa05-19d74ac7-93e4-048fe1f8a38e.
120 In Re Intex Technologies (India) Limited v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ),
Competition Commission of India, Case No. 76/2013 (Jan. 16, 2014); The Quarterly Newsletter of
Competition Commission of India (CCI), 18 FAIR PLAY, 13 (2015).
121 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp., C-170/13 ECJ (2015).
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multiple issues in respect to FRAND licensing which need to be dealt with, as is
evident from subsequent cases in Germany. The German FRAND jurisprudence has
evolved substantially in the past two years, particularly concerning grant of
injunctions and determination of abuse of dominance violating Article 102 TFEU.
The Indian courts and competition authority have been at the opposite ends of the
spectrum in dealing with FRAND matters. Though CCI is yet to come out with its
final decision, the Delhi High Court has been in consonance with the international
practices in granting injunctions.
The framework laid down in Huawei has not been explicitly applied in any of the
cases in India. In India, the courts have dealt with the conduct of both parties on a
case-by-case basis, without following any stringent steps as laid down in Huawei,
which was cited in Ericsson v. M/S Best IT World122 by the defendant, alleging that
the conduct of Ericsson did not comply with CJEU’s guidelines. However, this was
rejected by the Indian court on the basis of the evidence, which showed that the
defendant was in fact aware of Ericsson’s rights over the patents and, therefore, an
injunction was granted in favor of Ericsson. Before the court could go further into the
merits and any elaborate application of Huawei could happen, the parties entered
into a Global Licensing Agreement, and the pending case was disposed of.123 In
Ericsson v. CCI, the court stated, referring to Huawei, “there is good ground to hold
that seeking injunctive reliefs by an SEP holder in certain circumstances may amount
to abuse of its dominant position . . . risk of suffering injunction . . . undue pressure on
implementer.”124 It was determined that the SEP holder’s position is not equitable
with that of a non-essential patent holder, due to the lack of options for the licensee
in case of the former, thereby underlining the importance of protecting the interest of
the implementer.125 In spite of a seemingly pro-implementer position, the courts
have been efficient in identifying instances of possible reverse patent hold-up and
granting injunctions in most cases where the licensee was unwilling to execute an
agreement.126
Adopting the CJEU’s guidelines (or, the six-step test) in the Indian
jurisprudence will indeed make the process more time-efficient and less
ambiguous.127 Further, the Indian courts have not evaluated the initial offer made
by the SEP holder closely, and have referred to available comparable licenses to set

122 Ericsson v. M/S Best It World, The High Court of Delhi, I.A. No.17351/2015 in CS (OS)
2501/2015, 6, ¶ 12 (Sept. 2, 2015).
123 Ericsson and iBall entered into a Global Patent License Agreement (GPLA) in October 2015
and the suits were dismissed thereon. Rajesh Kurup, iBall, Ericsson settle patent issue, THE HINDU
BUSINESS LINE (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/iball-ericsson-settlepatent-issue/article7900713.ece.
124 Ericsson v. CCI, The High Court of Delhi, W.P.(C) 1006/2014, CM Nos.2037/2014, 2040/2014,
151, ¶ 199 (Mar. 30, 2016) (emphasis added).
125 Id.
126 Injunctions granted by the court in favor of Ericsson in separate proceedings against
Kingtech Electronics (India) Pvt. Ltd.; Mercury Electronics & Anr.; Intex Technologies (India) Ltd.;
and Xiaomi Technology.
127 See also Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Douglas H. Ginsburg, Bruce H. Kobayashi, and Joshua D.
Wright, FRAND in India, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER
SERIES, 16-32 (2017).
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interim royalty rates.128 Post Huawei, only the Vodafone judgment attempted to
determine FRAND compliance of the initial offer made by the SEP holder. The
Vodafone case also used comparable licenses, similar to the approach taken by Indian
courts. However, an important distinction is that in the former, the court held the
offer to be FRAND compliant, which the Indian courts have been reluctant to do.
Deciding upon the interim royalty rates is not exactly the same as determining
FRAND compliance, which gains even more importance when Indian competition
agency has prima facie held the conduct of the SEP holder as anti-competitive and
FRAND non-compliant. In the FRAND jurisprudence emerging around the world,
what stands out is that determining (reasonable) royalties for an essential patent has
been the most debatable129 issue due to the level of complexity of the underlying
issues. There have been multiple, and opposing, views regarding this contentious
issue. Apart from the method of looking at (considering) comparable licenses, courts
in the US have considered ‘hypothetical negotiation’ between a willing licensee and
willing licensor,130 which could be considered as a derivative of comparable licensing
methods. When it comes to the selection of the appropriate authority for the
determination of royalties, there are conflicting opinions as well.
On the one hand, setting of royalty rates by a competition authority is fiercely
opposed based on the argument that it will amount to intrusion of the competition
authority in free functioning of the market that goes against the mandate of any
competition authority.131 On the other hand, it has been contended that the courts
128 The court cautioned that these were mere interim royalty rates and not determination of
FRAND rates.
129 J. Gregory Sidak, What Aggregate Royalty Do Manufacturers of Mobile Phones Pay to License
Standard-Essential Patents?, 1 THE CRITERION JOURNAL OF INNOVATION 701 (2016)
https://www.criterioneconomics.com/aggregate-royalty-to-license-standard-essential-patents.html;
Anne Farrar & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Methodologies for Calculating FRAND Royalty Rates and
Damages:
An
Analysis
of
Existing
Case
Law,
LAW360
(Oct.
2014)
https://www.law360.com/articles/584906/methodologies-for-calculating-frand-damages-part-1;
J.
Gregory Sidak, The Proper Royalty Base For Patent Damages, 10(4) JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW
& ECONOMICS 989 (2014) https://www.criterioneconomics.com/the-proper-royalty-base-for-patentdamages.html; Jorge Padilla and Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Portfolio Licensing at The End-User Device
Level: Analyzing Refusals to License FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at The Component
Level, SSRN (2016) https://ssrn.com/abstract=2806688; John C. Jarosz & Michael J. Chapman, The
Hypothetical Negotiation and Reasonable Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging The Dog, 16 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 769 (2013); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable
Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28(2) BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1135 (2013); Wong-Ervin et.
al., FRAND in India; Jorge L. Contreras, Injunctive Relief in U.S. Patent Cases, UNIV. OF UTAH
COLLEGE OF LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 183 (2017).
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Inc., 2013 WL 2111217, 16 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013); Laser Dynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer,
Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 60 n. 2 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“This court has sanctioned the use of the Georgia–Pacific
factors to frame the reasonable royalty inquiry. Those factors properly tie the reasonable royalty
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are not well-equipped to set royalty rates, due to a lack of information needed to
suitably determine royalties. It is instead suggested that the Standard Setting
Organizations (SSOs) are better equipped to determine such rates, right before the
patent invention is declared essential, which will reflect the true value of inventions
in comparison to the alternative (i.e. before it becomes standard).132 Another
important element is that of determining the ‘royalty base’, which in itself is such a
complex issue and would require a separate paper focusing solely on it. Finally,
Indian courts have not had the chance to examine the FRAND compliance of a
counter-offer made by an implementer. This is primarily because in most cases there
were no counter-offers and the court had to set royalty rates itself. This is
supplemented by the fact that most of the implementers in these disputes were held
as ‘unwilling licensee’ by the court, after examining their conduct, held as tactics for
delaying negotiations.

https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/competition-authorities-support-grasshopperscompetition-law-as-a-threat-to-innovation/.
132 Stanley M. Besen, Why Royalties for Standard Essential Patents Should Not Be Set By The
Courts, 15 CHI. – KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 19 (2016); Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2163 (2007).

